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The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy
Fidelity in Europe
David Voas
Two issues have been especially contentious in debates over religious change in Europe:
the unity or diversity of the trends observed across the continent, and the significance of
the large subpopulation that is neither religious nor completely unreligious. This article
addresses these problems. An analysis of the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS)
shows that each generation in every country surveyed is less religious than the last.
Although there are some minor differences in the speed of the decline (the most religious
countries are changing more quickly than the least religious), the magnitude of the fall in
religiosity during the last century has been remarkably constant across the continent.
Despite these shifts in the prevalence of conventional Christian belief, practice and
self-identification, residual involvement is considerable. Many people are neither regular
churchgoers nor self-consciously non-religious. The term ‘fuzzy fidelity’ describes this casual
loyalty to tradition. Religion usually plays only a minor role in the lives of such people.
Religious change in European countries follows a common trajectory whereby fuzzy fidelity
rises and then falls over a very extended period. The starting points are different across the
continent, but the forces at work may be much the same.
Introduction
Europe is a key battleground in the sociology of
religion. The facts are fought over by every school of
thought and have been claimed to support the
secularization thesis (Bruce, 2002), the market model
(Stark and Iannaccone, 1994), or some third way
(Davie, 2000, 2002). Two key issues have been
especially contentious: the unity or diversity of the
trends observed across the continent, and the sig-
nificance of the large subpopulation that is neither
religious nor unreligious. This article addresses these
two problems.
One common objection to the secularization para-
digm is that European countries display no common
pattern of religious change. Some show high levels
of affiliation, other have high levels of participation,
yet others may be low in both but have not aban-
doned religion. Because there is no clear or common
pattern or trend, the argument goes, the standard
story of secularization must be wrong. Perhaps no
single explanation of the religious situation is ade-
quate, such is the diversity one finds across the
continent.
Based on an analysis of retrospective questions from
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),
Iannaccone (2003) suggests that the variety of reli-
gious trends he finds implies that secularization
theory applies to few countries. Another prominent
exponent of what one might call the ‘ragbag thesis’
is Andrew Greeley, whose avowed aim in a book
entitled Religion in Europe at the End of the Second
Millennium is to dispute the ‘dogma’ of religious
decline. He writes:
In fact, if one looks at Europe with a relatively
open mind, prepared to be surprised by its complexity,
one discovers a wide variety of religious phenomena.
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In some countries, religion has increased (most
notably the former communist countries and especially
Russia), in others it has declined (most notably Britain,
the Netherlands, and France), and in still other
countries it is relatively unchanged (the traditional
Catholic countries), and in yet other countries (some
of the social democratic countries) it has both declined
and increased. A single, one-directional model does
not begin to cope with the variety of religious
phenomena in Europe. . . . ‘secularization’ . . . is patently
a useless theory because it says too much and hence
fails to subsume a wide variety of interesting data
(Greeley, 2003, p. xi).
Note that this approach does concede an important
point: Europe is not a single entity but rather a
collection of two dozen or more separate societies.
If it is impossible to generalize about religious change
in Europe, then the secularization thesis is indeed
useless. If one can find a common account that
works for these disparate countries, however, then the
theory is potentially useful, especially if it may
also apply elsewhere (e.g. in Canada, Australia and
New Zealand, or even in Japan). While the sheer
variety of history and culture across Europe makes
unitary explanation a challenge, any hypothesis that
survives testing in this arena has a considerable
advantage.
Data
The study described here is based on an analysis of the
first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). The
data were collected in 2002/2003 in 22 nations (the 21
listed in Table 1 below, plus Israel). The second wave
of the ESS, conducted two years later, is unfortunately
less useful for present purposes because a key question
on the importance of religion was not included.
The data were gathered using personal interviews
supplemented by short self-completion questionnaires.
A great deal of expert attention was devoted to
sampling strategy, translation, methods, and quality
assurance, with the highest possible level of
cross-national comparability. In producing repre-
sentative samples, obtaining a high response rate was
a key objective. The standards of design and
execution are exceptionally high. Comprehensive
documentation is available online at http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org/
ESS data are archived in Norway, and are freely
accessible at http://ess.nsd.uib.no.
Religion—Questions and Scale
Construction
The ESS provides better coverage of religion than most
general purpose surveys, notwithstanding the organi-
zers’ modest view that in this dataset religion is better
used as an explanatory variable than as something to
be studied in its own right (Billiet, 2003). The survey
questions cover the three main areas of affiliation,
practice and belief, as follows:
Affiliation: current or past identification with a
religion
Practice: frequency of attendance at religious
services, frequency of private prayer
Belief: self-rated religiosity, importance of religion
in respondent’s life
While the questions ‘how religious would you say
you are?’ and ‘how important is religion in your life?’
do not measure beliefs directly, it seems likely that
there is a strong association between these variables
and strength of religious belief. A further set of items
on involvement in church or religious organizations
(membership, participation, giving, volunteering, and
friendship) were excluded from the analysis presented
here on the grounds that they show little systematic
relationship with each other or with the other vari-
ables. National culture may have a strong influence;
considerable numbers of people volunteered or made
donations without being members and vice versa.
Given that religious activity is already represented by
attendance and prayer, these additional variables may
be superfluous in any case.
There are three levels of affiliation (never belonged,
previously belonged, and currently belong), while
frequency of attendance and prayer are measured in
seven categories. Respondents chose values between 0
and 10 to describe their religiosity and the importance
of religion in their lives. One finds considerable
heaping of responses on 0, 5, and 10, with lower
frequencies in the adjacent categories. To produce
more bell-shaped curves, and also to give these
variables equal weight in a raw score when combined
with the 7-point religious practice variables, the 11
categories were collapsed into 7. [The recoding was
done as follows: 0, (1, 2), (3, 4), 5, (6, 7), (8, 9), 10].
For church attendance, the distribution is sharply
skewed in the direction of ‘never’. Prayer, on the other
hand, produces a U-shaped pattern, with most people
at one extreme (frequent prayer) or the other (seldom
or never praying).
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One option would be to analyse each of these
variables separately. Here, however, we are not
especially interested in church affiliation, attendance,
or belief for their own sake but rather as signs of
individual religious commitment. We may conjecture
that all six of these variables can be treated as observed
indicators of a single underlying quality of religiosity.
If so, then it would make sense to combine them into
a scale measure of that latent attribute. Because each
individual variable reflects the quality we wish to
capture only imperfectly, a scale that draws on all of
them collectively should be more valid and reliable
than any one of them separately.
We might find, of course, that these variables seem
to be measuring different things; perhaps, for example,
there is a ‘private commitment’ dimension and a
‘public participation’ dimension. In fact, careful
analysis shows that these variables do meet the key
criteria for combination into a scale. In particular, they
are highly correlated with each other and with the
index of religiosity derived from them.
(As a concrete example of evidence for the assertion
that the items are closely related, the declining
trajectory of private prayer in Ireland is very similar
to that for public worship. Of people born before the
Second World War, 78 per cent pray every day, and
most of the remainder do so at least weekly; a mere
6 per cent pray only on ‘special holy days’, less often,
or never. Of those born since 1965, the proportion
praying daily is down to a just over a quarter and
falling while the numbers seldom or never praying are
a third and rising.)
Another possible objection is that respondents have
been asked directly how religious they are; perhaps it is
unnecessary or even unwise to use a different measure
of religiosity. People are not necessarily the best judges
of their own characteristics, though. They may feel
themselves to be highly religious, but we might wish to
moderate this assessment if they never go to church or
pray (and conversely for people who practise a great
deal and say that religion is personally important,
without claiming to be especially religious). In any
event, it is reassuring that the correlation between
respondents’ subjective ratings of religiosity and the
scale described below is very high (0.86).
The classical approach to measurement combines
items that are highly correlated. If the value of a
standard statistic such as Cronbach’s Alpha is suffi-
ciently high (and in this case it is 0.87, which is
excellent), the sum of the variable values would be
used as a composite index of religiosity (which is
assumed to be the underlying construct being
Table 1 Self-described belonging, religiosity, and importance of religion for ‘fuzzy’ respondents, ESS 2002
Belong Religiosity Importance
Low Low–med Above av. above av.
Austria 68.8 13.5 65.2 21.2 18.9
Belgium 41.2 14.0 56.7 29.3 17.3
Czech Republic 35.8 18.1 64.8 17.1 14.9
Denmark 61.2 6.0 77.0 16.9 9.9
Finland 72.1 4.6 63.1 32.3 12.7
France 52.7 20.4 65.3 14.3 14.0
Germany 69.5 8.3 73.2 18.5 14.4
Greece 92.3 8.5 72.3 19.2 46.7
Hungary 69.9 10.1 75.8 14.1 15.3
Ireland 76.7 12.6 78.7 8.7 31.6
Italy 62.9 8.5 75.4 16.0 28.1
Luxembourg 78.8 18.1 71.7 10.1 19.3
Netherlands 28.9 9.1 55.0 35.9 10.1
Norway 53.2 6.1 78.3 15.6 10.0
Poland 88.9 7.0 88.2 4.9 38.6
Portugal 82.4 9.5 81.7 8.8 27.9
Slovenia 45.5 8.1 76.3 15.5 17.5
Spain 83.0 17.1 75.3 7.6 23.4
Sweden 28.7 12.5 68.5 19.0 10.7
Switzerland 58.7 8.7 67.1 24.2 12.7
United Kingdom 48.7 8.4 72.5 19.0 12.0
Average (unweighted) 61.9 10.9 71.5 17.5 19.3
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manifested through the responses). Such a procedure
yields a fairly uniform distribution of scores over the
range from least religious to most religious.
This method has various problems. In particular, it
takes no account of the relative ‘difficulty’ of the
various items. For example, if three variables apply to
more than half the population (e.g. belief in a higher
power, infant baptism, and attendance at least once a
year), while a fourth applies to only a small fraction of
it (e.g. self-description as highly religious), then it is
misleading for most people to receive a score of 3
while the minority rates only a 4. At best the scores
can be treated as ordinal measures of religiosity. If
however we need an index that can be treated as an
interval scale (for example because we wish to compare
the average religiosity of different groups of people),
then the classical approach is unsatisfactory.
Although sociologists have rarely ventured beyond
the classical methods, researchers in psychology and
education have developed an alternative approach to
measurement known as item response theory (IRT).
Here the basic idea is that each respondent has more
or less of the latent attribute and each item (question)
is more or less demanding of that attribute. Depending
on your mathematical ability, you will have varying
success in answering questions in arithmetic, inter-
mediate algebra, and differential calculus. Correctly
solving one or two calculus problems may say more
about your ability than doing dozens of easy sums. By
looking at the interaction between items and respon-
dents we can construct a scale that allows us to
compare not only one individual with another but also
one difference in scores with another.
The requirements for constructing successful scale of
this kind are substantially more onerous than under
classical measurement theory. For example, the items
must form a hierarchy from ‘easy’ to ‘difficult’; the
characteristic curves that represent the probability of
someone with any given level of the attribute ‘passing’
each item should not cross. (For further details see
Embretson and Reise, 2000; Sijtsma and Molenaar,
2002; for applications to religious belief, see Van
Schuur, 2003; Lu¨chau, 2007.)
The religiosity scale used here is a one-parameter
IRT model, also known as a Rasch model. It was
created using RUMM2020 software. The five poly-
tomous variables described above formed a scale rated
as ‘excellent’ according to the various tests in this
package. The assignment of scores to each individual
produces a scale that is more stretched than the
‘classical’ version; the distribution that results is
roughly bell-shaped rather than rectangular. This
picture is consistent with our intuition (and some
evidence) that most people are not far from the
religious norm, whatever that happens to be in a given
time and place, while some are much more or much
less religious than average. The uniform distribution
implied by the classical scores is less plausible.
The use of IRT methods was motivated by the
conviction that this measurement model is the best in
this context. It is worth noting, however, that the
results that follow do not depend upon this choice; the
classical scores show the same trends and contrasts.
For a statistically sophisticated discussion of the cross-
national construct equivalence of the items used, see
Billiet and Welkenhuysen-Gybels (2004).
Findings
For ease of presentation, 20 countries in the ESS 2002
dataset (leaving out Israel, about which something will
be said later, and Luxembourg, which is much like
Belgium on these measures) can be divided for
convenience into groups of higher and lower average
religiosity. Catholic countries are well represented in
the former set, while northern and eastern European
countries tend to be in the latter. Greeley and others
claim that not only does average religiosity vary, there
is no common pattern of change across these
countries. They assert that although there has been
decline in a few countries, religiosity is static or even
increasing in most.
It is instructive to examine the mean level of
religiosity by 5-year age group for each country in
the sample. The first group encompasses all who were
born prior to 1920; subsequent groups include those
born during 1920–1924, 1925–1929, etc., through to
1980–1984. Figure 1 shows the generational differences
for each country.
The most striking observation is that not only is
decline in religiosity across the birth cohorts universal
in all of these countries, the graphs are fairly linear and
remarkably parallel. In other words, the rate of decline
seems to have been essentially constant both over time
and across Europe. (The argument that these patterns
merely reflect increasing religiosity with age is
considered in the next section.)
If we compare people born in the early 1980s with
their grandparents’ generation (born in the late 1920s),
we find an average gap of exactly 1 scale point across
the 21 countries. The same two-generation difference
in the index is found in most of the countries
individually: a range from 0.88 to 1.27 in the religiosity
score gap includes two thirds of the nations, the
exceptions being Hungary, Ireland and Spain (higher)
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and Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Slovenia (lower).
To put it another way, the pattern of decline has been
similar everywhere, with the result that the overall rank
order by religiosity has been largely preserved from the
early to the late 20th century; there has however been
some regression to the mean. The more religious
countries (particularly in the Catholic group) have
declined most; the more secular countries (especially in
Scandinavia) have declined least.
In the most secular countries—the Czech Republic,
Sweden, and France—the curve appears to flatten out
in the last couple of decades. People born in the early
1980s are much the same in religious terms as those
born in the early 1960s. It is tempting to suppose that
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Figure 1 Religiosity by country and year of birth
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secularization has run its course, leaving a certain
amount of religion to fight another day. There may
be some truth in this finding: no one expects atheism
to become universal. It is important to appreciate,
though, just how low these levels are. Even ignoring
the exceptionally low scores in the Czech Republic, the
mean levels amongst French and Swedish adults would
equate to being in the next-to-lowest response category
on each religion question: almost never attending
or praying and choosing values just one step up
from ‘extremely unimportant’ (about religion in life)
and ‘extremely unreligious’ (as a self-description). Of
course we know that some people are religiously active,
which thus implies that many others are indeed at the
extreme end of the scale.
There is also some evidence of levelling out
elsewhere at more appreciable scores, notably in
Slovenia, Greece, and Finland. It remains to be seen
whether this phenomenon will be enduring or
transitory.
It is interesting (and reassuring) that in neighbour-
ing or culturally similar countries the levels of
religiosity and patterns of change correspond closely
in these results. There is evidently an ‘Alpine’ pattern
(Switzerland and Austria) and a virtually standard
Benelux pattern (Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg). Likewise the curves for Norway and
Denmark are difficult to distinguish, and the graphs
for Italy, Portugal, and Spain are similar. Finland
seems markedly more religious than Sweden, however,
and perhaps less surprisingly Catholic Ireland is
very different from the predominantly Protestant/
Anglican UK.
Although there is obviously religious variety in
Europe, the differences are as much generational as
cultural. The oldest cohort in every country outside
Scandinavia is more religious than the overall mean;
the youngest cohort in every country outside Greece
and Poland (and marginally Italy and Ireland) is less
religious than average. In terms of religiosity, young
Italians are more like older Swedes than they are like
their own grandparents.
Age or Cohort Effects?
There are two possible interpretations of Figure 1. The
first is that religion is in long-term decline in northern,
southern, western, and eastern Europe, and that this
decline is essentially generational: each birth cohort
is somewhat less religious than the one before. The
alternative interpretation is that in every country on
the continent people become progressively more
religious with age. On this view, there is no reason
to expect decline, because the people who are highly
secular today will be faithful tomorrow—or at any rate
in 50 years.
Unfortunately for those who resist the secularization
thesis, the ‘age effect’ hypothesis receives little support
from the evidence. The effects would need to be large,
systematic, and universal. Such effects are usually
conjectured to come about as a result of major life
stages such as marriage, raising children, or seeing the
end of life approaching. These events are concentrated
in particular age ranges, however, and there is no sign
from the graphs that the patterns are similarly
punctuated. The curves show continuous transition
from one year of birth to the next, rather than jumps
from lower to higher plateaus.
In addition, it is clear that in at least some countries
people do not become more religious with age. At this
point it is worth looking at the one country in the ESS
not so far considered: Israel. Although Israel has a
substantial minority of highly religious people, its
general level of religiosity is no higher than the
European average. In sharp contrast to the other 21
countries in the survey, however, there is no indication
that older Israelis are more religious than their
children and grandchildren. The results discussed
above are neither some curious artefact of the measure
used nor an inevitable product of the lifecycle.
The view that we are seeing absolute decline rather
than merely a sign that people become more religious
with age is further reinforced by repeated cross-
sectional surveys. According to Eurobarometer data,
attendance dropped substantially in every European
country during the last three decades of the 20th
century (see Norris and Inglehart, 2004, Table 3.5).
The European/World Values Survey tells a similar
story. One could argue that these changes are period
effects (i.e. one-off, across-the-board shifts) rather than
generational decline, but in any event they are
incompatible with pure age effects.
Finally, we do possess some studies based on
sophisticated longitudinal analysis that can help to
identify the source of the changes. In Britain, it is quite
clear that the differences should be explained on the
basis of cohort and not age or period effects (Voas and
Crockett, 2005; Crockett and Voas, 2006). Similar
evidence is available for Germany (Wolf, 2008).
Although we lack good material in English on other
countries, a Dutch study of West Germany, Austria,
the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Italy, and Great
Britain concluded that the gap between young and old
in religiosity simply results from the fact that people
born earlier in time are more likely to be religious.
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To the extent that an age effect could be detected, it
was in the opposite direction to the one suggested:
older people are more likely to have lost religion than
younger people (Te Grotenhuis et al., 1997). The
evidence we possess points unambiguously to the
generational nature of religious decline, and gives no
support to the conjecture that most Europeans enter
adulthood relatively unreligious and gradually become
devout as they go through life.
Secularity versus Fuzzy Fidelity
Unlike Americans, Europeans are accustomed to the
idea of state-supported religious education, religious
broadcasting on network television, religious parties in
the legislature, and so on. Perhaps as a result, some
Europeans feel that they need protection from religious
institutions. None the less, the implicit assumption
seems to be that a modest dose of religion is good for
people—or at least other people. The notion that
God’s function is to make children well behaved,
strangers helpful, and shopkeepers honest means that
outright secularism is less popular than one might
suppose. But as we ourselves, having little desire for
divine supervision, are mostly secular, the benign
acceptance of public religion does little apart from
frustrate secularists and religious leaders impartially.
As argued above, the religious changes we observe in
Europe occur largely across rather than within
generations. There is considerable stability in religious
involvement over the course of adult life (especially
on average, for people born during some period).
That being so, the smooth continuous declines
across birth cohorts shown in Figure 1 may represent
a changing mix of the religious and secular, rather
than a progressive dilution of religiosity at the
individual level.
We know, though, that religious commitment is not
dichotomous (so that people are either religious or
non-religious). Despite dramatic shifts in the preva-
lence of conventional Christian belief, practice, and
self-identification, residual involvement is considerable.
Many people remain interested in church weddings
and funerals, Christmas services, and local festivals.
They believe in ‘something out there’, pay at least lip
service to Christian values, and may be willing to
identify with a denomination. They are neither regular
churchgoers (now only a small minority of the
population in most European countries) nor self-
consciously non-religious. Because they retain some
loyalty to tradition, though in a rather uncommitted
way, we can call the phenomenon fuzzy fidelity.
(This kind of fuzziness is not the same as that
discussed in Zinnbauer et al. (1997), where the term
was used in reference to alternative spirituality.)
The Fuzziness of Belief
None of the three main aspects of religious involvement—
belief, practice, and affiliation—is unambiguous. If we
take the rather strict view that religious people must
accept specific articles of faith and know basic church
doctrine, for example, then only a fraction of the
population will qualify. If we suppose that accepting the
existence of a higher power or an ultimate moral order
counts as religious belief, the proportion will be much
greater.
Opinion polls in Europe show high levels of belief,
not merely in religious or quasi-religious ideas (such as
reincarnation), but also in folk superstition: horo-
scopes, clairvoyance, ghosts, and so on (see Day, 2006
on the ‘secular supernatural’). It is far from clear that
these beliefs make any difference to the people
claiming them. Studies on polling show that people
are prepared to express opinions about almost any-
thing, whether or not they have any knowledge of or
interest in the topic. Such ‘beliefs’ may be uninformed,
held superficially, seldom acted upon, and relatively
volatile. Feeling required to hold and even to express
opinions is one thing; finding those issues important
is another.
While 25 per cent of respondents in some European
countries may say that they believe in reincarnation,
one is not inclined to feel that they thereby express any
basic truths about their own identities. The corollary,
though, is that it is difficult to be too impressed by
the apparent number of conventional believers. The
argument here is not that the large subpopulation that
acknowledges the God of our fathers—the memorably-
styled ‘ordinary God’ (Davie, 1994)—is shallow or
insincere. The point is simply that we cannot conclude
from the fact that people tell pollsters they believe in
God that they give the matter any thought, find it
significant, will feel the same next year, or plan to do
anything about it. While economists claim that there is
no such thing as a free lunch, survey responses come
very close.
In any event, one can no longer infer from the
widespread inclination to believe in a broadly defined
God that people are basically Christian. Opinion polls
over recent decades suggest (even given the previous
caveats about interpreting survey evidence) that the
characteristically Christian beliefs—particularly in Jesus
as the Son of God—have been in decline, and are
now held by a minority (Gill et al., 1998; see also
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The Tablet, 18 December 1999, p. 1729). Many people
would like to be known as ‘spiritual’ (the alternatives
seem unattractive; who wants to be labelled a
‘materialist’?) and will therefore acknowledge a belief
in something, but that something is less and less likely
to be recognizable as religious doctrine. In the 2001
Scottish Social Attitudes survey, respondents who
said they believed in God divided fairly equally
between ‘a personal creator God’, ‘a higher power or
life-force’, and ‘there is something there’ (Bruce and
Glendinning, 2003).
Some people call themselves Christians but have few
or no discernible Christian beliefs: they are considered in
the next section. Among those fuzzy Christians who
have religious or spiritual beliefs, we can distinguish two
cognitive styles. Many entertain beliefs about their fate,
the afterlife, a higher power, and the like that are quasi-
religious but inconsistent with the teachings of the
major Christian denominations. What we might call
‘popular heterodoxy’ combines elements of astrology,
reincarnation, divination, magic, folk religion, and
conventional Christianity. Such melanges are not
particularly coherent, but those who hold them tend
not to reflect deeply on their worldviews. In any event,
the salience of these beliefs is typically rather low. In
contrast, the ‘Sheilaists’ are more conscious of spiritual
seeking. ‘Sheilaism’ was the self-applied label used by a
respondent (‘Sheila Larson’, a young nurse) in Habits of
the Heart: ‘ ‘‘I believe in God,’’ Sheila says. ‘‘I am not a
religious fanatic. I can’t remember the last time I went to
church. My faith has carried me a long way. It’s
Sheilaism. Just my own little voice’’ ’ (Bellah et al., 1985,
p. 221). The number of self-conscious seekers is small.
Heelas and Woodhead’s pioneering attempt to identify
people in a small English town who were in any way
involved in what they termed the ‘holistic milieu’ put
the figure at less than 2 per cent and over half of them
denied that their involvement in reiki, yoga, aromather-
apy, and the like was spiritual (Heelas and Woodhead,
2005; Voas and Bruce, 2007). Interest in psychological
and physical ‘well-being’ was more common than
spiritual seeking. A more substantial proportion of the
population will privately follow a variety of self-
spirituality. Those who are most engaged with the
process may reject Christianity, but others will see their
spirituality as consistent with Christian identification.
Of course people may call themselves Christian even
if they have no religious beliefs. Many nominal
adherents are lapsed agnostics: they used to have
doubts, and now they just do not care. Arguably most
are secular for all practical purposes. It is time to
consider how people respond when asked ‘what is your
religion?’
The Fuzziness of Christian Identity
Long after active religious participation has ceased,
people may still want services for special occasions;
after even that degree of interest has waned, they may
still accept association with their religion of origin. The
result is similar to a self-description as working class
by the owner of a large business, or claims to Irishness
by Americans who have a grandparent from Galway.
Such personal identities may be personally meaningful,
but the chances of passing them successfully to the
next generation are slim. In any event, a characteristic
tends to disappear from our self-description as it loses
its social significance. Being a Muslim currently seems
sufficiently salient that very few European Muslims
would not describe themselves as such; for relatively
few ‘Christians’ is the same true.
Most Europeans are still able to specify their
religious background, just as they can name their
birthplace, father’s occupation, and secondary school,
but whether these things make any difference to how
they see themselves or the way they are perceived by
others is not at all certain. Notoriously, many people
who to all appearances are unreligious do choose an
affiliation if asked, depending on the wording and
context of the question. These nominal Christians
comprise more than half the population in most
European countries. The following description of three
important subgroups is paraphrased from Day (2006).
Natal nominalists ascribe their Christianity to
familial heritage alone. Typically they were baptised
and attended church when they were young. They are
unsure whether God exists, but in any case he does not
play a part in their lives. They do not refer to any
religion or deity in answer to questions about what
they believe in, what is important to them, what guides
them morally, what makes them happy or sad, their
purpose in life or what happens after they die. Natal
nominalists admit that they rarely, if ever, think about
their religious identity. They assume religious identity
is something one acquires through birth or early
upbringing.
Ethnic nominalists describe themselves as Christian
to position themselves as different from others. Like
natal nominalists, Christian ethnic nominalists are not
convinced about God, do not engage in religious
practice and do not give the matter much thought.
They differ in describing themselves as Christian as a
way of identifying with a people or culture. They see
themselves as belonging to a distinct group, which
may be national (e.g. English as distinct from Welsh)
rather than necessarily racial. In doing so, they clearly
aim to separate themselves from other groups
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(currently Muslims form the major ‘other’ for
Europeans) that are identified with a different faith.
Aspirational nominalists describe themselves as
Christian, and perhaps more specifically as part of an
established church, because they want to belong to this
group. It represents something to which they aspire.
The emphasis on membership of a group is shared
with ethnic nominalists, but the identity carries for
them an additional notion of middle class respect-
ability and confidence. In their view, the label is
attached not simply to people like themselves but to
people like they want to be.
The Fuzziness of Religious Practice
Finally, while it is unusual to find unreligious people
in church, religious practice can occur even among the
secular. People accompany religious parents or
spouses, go for the music, or hope to qualify their
children for church-affiliated schools. Private prayer is
frequently practised even by people who do not
identify with a religion, attend services, or believe in
a personal God (Ba¨nziger, 2006); whether and to what
extent such people are thereby shown to be ‘spiritual’
rather than ‘secular’ is debatable.
Religious ceremonies for rites of passage remain
popular, though much less so than previously, and
some occasional services with a strong social dimen-
sion (e.g. church weddings and baptisms or harvest
festivals and the like) draw large congregations.
Christmas attracts two and a half times as many
people to the Church of England as appear on a
normal Sunday. It seems very likely, though, that
tradition and nostalgia rather than sporadic religious
enthusiasm are largely responsible for high turnout at
such times.
Estimating the Reach of Fuzzy Fidelity
There are various ways, then, in which the connection
to religion may be fuzzy rather than clear. Beyond all
of these definitional and methodological issues, one
question stands out: how much does religion matter to
people? Many will believe in God, call themselves
Christian, and appear in church on occasion, but does
that suffice for them to be usefully regarded as
religious?
We can try to estimate the relative sizes of the
religious, wholly secular and fuzzy constituencies using
data from the first wave of the ESS. One approach to
classification is to use statistical techniques such as
cluster analysis or, for categorical variables, latent class
analysis (LCA). With religiosity it seems doubtful
whether LCA produces results that are sufficiently
superior to those from an a priori classification to
justify the methodological complexity. Because there is
clustering at the upper and lower ends of a religiosity
spectrum, the main issue is whether the middle range
is subdivided or not. It is simple to demarcate the
categories desired using explicit criteria, and the classes
produced using methods like LCA tend not to be very
different.
Advocates of these statistical approaches might argue
that even if a simpler method does almost as well, their
classifications still correspond better to the (assumed)
latent traits. The problem is that an explicit a priori
definition is much easier to interpret. In contrast, the
categories identified inductively via LCA can be
described in any number of ways, and it is open to
debate whether the labels adopted are the best ones for
people in a given category.
For the sake of clarity, then, it seems best to
stipulate what terms like ‘religious’ and ‘unreligious’
mean in relation to the data available, rather than to
apply the labels to respondents who have been grouped
together by LCA. One option would be to use these
descriptions for respondents who scored above or
below certain threshold values on the religiosity scale
created previously. It would not necessarily be clear
what these values implied, however, and for the sake of
transparency more explicit criteria based on fixed
values of some of the variables would be preferable.
Thus people will only be classified as religious if they
rate themselves at 6 or higher on a scale from 0 (not at
all religious) to 10 (very religious). In addition, they
must either attend services at least monthly or, if not,
describe religion as at least moderately important in
their lives (6þ on the scale).
A rather strict definition of being unreligious would
require the respondent to satisfy all of the following:
 attends only at major holidays, less often, or never;
 prays only at major holidays, less often, or never;
 rates self as 0, 1, or 2 on a scale from 0 (not at all
religious) to 10 (very religious);
 describes the importance of religion in his/her
life as 0, 1, or 2 on a scale from 0 (extremely
unimportant) to 10 (extremely important).
These two categories still only account for barely
half the population across the continent. In some
instances, the proportions are even smaller; about
20 per cent of people in Denmark, for example, count
as religious, with only fractionally more qualifying as
unreligious. The residual, intermediate group is the
largest in all except the most religious countries
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(Greece, Poland, Ireland, Italy, and—marginally—
Portugal).
One wants to know what characterizes this fuzzy
middle half of the population. This group may simply
be at intermediate (and possibly confused) stages
between religion and irreligion. Alternatively, it may
be distinguished from the others by characteristics on
separate dimensions. A possible typology is as follows:
Conventionally religious Actively observant
Privately committed
Unconventionally
religious/spiritual
Sheilaism
Popular heterodoxy
Nominal adherents Natal nominalists
Ethnic nominalists
Aspirational nominalists
Non-religious Agnostics
Atheists
In the religion module of ISSP, the question on
belief offers options that are sceptical (‘I don’t believe
in God’ or ‘I don’t know whether there is a God and I
don’t believe there is any way to find out’) and
religious (‘I know God really exists and I have no
doubts about it’). Judging from the numbers, it seems
reasonable to suppose that most of those in the middle
group identified here will fall into one or another of
the remaining ISSP categories for belief:
 I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe
in a Higher Power of some kind;
 I find myself believing in God some of the time,
but not at others;
 While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
As for religious practice, few of these people attend
church services except for weddings, funerals, and
possibly on special occasions such as Christmas. Many
never pray, but some do so weekly or even daily.
The proportions identifying with a religious group
vary considerably from country to country depending
on the cultural significance of denominational affilia-
tion; see the first column in Table 1. In Greece, the
figure exceeds 90 per cent, while in the Netherlands
and Sweden it is below 30 per cent (somewhat
surprisingly in the case of Sweden, where nominal
membership in the national church is widespread).
In terms of general orientation, these respondents
are by definition neither particularly religious nor
unreligious. The large majority (about 70 per cent on
average) place themselves at points 3, 4, or 5 on the
0–10 scale from ‘not at all religious’ to ‘very religious’.
The anomalies are interesting; in the Netherlands and
Finland about a third describe themselves as more
religious than not (i.e. 6 or higher on the scale), while
in Poland, Spain, and Portugal relatively few do so.
It evidently does not seem paradoxical for some
respondents in basically secular but historically
Protestant countries to say that they are religious and
at the same time that religion is not especially
important in their lives.
What is striking, in fact, is how little religion seems
to matter to most fuzzy Christians. Only in the most
religious countries do more than a quarter think that
religion is personally somewhat important rather than
unimportant. Elsewhere, the very large majority of
these respondents see religion as not very important,
and for a quarter or more it is very unimportant (0, 1,
or 2 on the 0–10 scale).
The dominant attitude towards religion, then, is not
one of rejection or hostility. Many of those in the large
middle group who are neither religious nor unreligious
are willing to identify with a religion, are open to the
existence of God or a higher power, may use the
church for rites of passage, and might pray at least
occasionally. What seems apparent, though, is that
religion plays a very minor role (if any) in their lives.
National Distributions of Fuzzy
Christianity by Year of Birth
Instead of looking just at average religiosity (as in
Figure 1), it may be more enlightening to consider the
three categories of religious, wholly secular, and in
between. In every country, there is an evident decline
in the relative size of the religious component of the
population as one moves from older to younger
generations, accompanied by growth in the wholly
secular component (Figure 2). The intermediate group,
though, has become larger over time in the most
religious countries (e.g. Greece and Italy) and slightly
smaller in the least religious (Sweden and the Czech
Republic), with stability or modest growth in the
middle group (e.g. Switzerland and Germany). These
six countries—two at each end and two in the middle
of the range shown in Figure 1—are illustrative, but
the findings do not depend on the selection.
At first blush these results might suggest that critics
of secularization theory are right after all; perhaps
there is no single pattern that describes religious
change in Europe. The mean religiosity scores plotted
in Figure 1 might conceal important differences between
subgroups. Recent work has tended to emphasize the
‘patchwork’ character of religion in Europe (Draulans
and Halman, 2005; Halman and Draulans, 2006).
The diversity of these countries in history, culture, and
religious character is undeniable.
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The crucial issue concerns the large subpopulation
that is neither obviously religious nor entirely secular.
The major debates over religious change in the modern
world concern precisely this group. They can be seen
as a sign of secularization, or conversely as a religious
market waiting for the right product to come along.
European sociologists of the ‘third way’ might see
them as consumers of individuated religion or
non-institutional spirituality, or again as a group that
believes without belonging.
In fact the apparently very distinct situations shown in
Figure 2 proceed naturally from a common trajectory of
religious decline. What varies is when the decline began
and (to a lesser extent) how rapidly it is proceeding.
This theory rests on a single assumption: people
stop being religious more quickly than they start being
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Figure 2 Religiosity by decade of birth in six European countries
Notes: The vertical axis gives a percentage (of the relevant age group). On the horizontal axis, the years of birth
are grouped as follows: pre-1925, 1925–1934, . . .1975–1984. The labels refer to the midpoints of these groups,
e.g. 1945–1954 is marked 1950. The three categories are defined in the text. People identifying with any non-Christian
religion apart from Judaism are excluded.
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wholly secular. Change, moreover, is typically very
slow, because it is largely a generational phenomenon.
There is therefore a long transitional period during
which fuzzy fidelity characterizes an important part
of the population. The crucial claim (which has in the
past been difficult to substantiate but can be clearly
supported with this evidence) is that this middle
category is transient, not something that will
persist indefinitely in a less regimented but still religious
world.
Many different formulae are available as mathemat-
ical models of social change: trends might be linear,
exponential, cyclical, or something else. A standard
model for epidemics, population growth under
resource constraints, and the diffusion of innovations,
is the logistic (or S-shaped) curve. To make matters
more concrete, assume that religious people account
for 95 per cent of the population at the onset of
secularization, with a highly secular minority of just
1 per cent; the remainder are fuzzy Christians. Change
occurs gradually, but the religious group declines
slightly faster than the secular proportion grows.
The pattern that results, projected over 200 years, is
shown in Figure 3.
This very simple model of religious decline, slightly
slower secular growth, and a middle category making
up the difference between the two might appear to be
merely a theoretical abstraction covering a period far
too long to allow any proper test. The graph is
remarkably successful, however, in representing
the data from the 21 countries considered here. The
onset of secularization varied from one country to
another, and hence the national graphs in Figure 2
match progressively later segments of the model in
Figure 3.
Each of the national graphs shows 60 years of
religious change (assuming that the differences by year
of birth do indeed represent cohort rather than age
effects). If secularization happened at the same pace
everywhere, then none of these graphs should need to
be shrunk or stretched to fit the model in Figure 3. In
fact, of course, there are some variations in the speed
as well as the onset of secularization. Some countries
such as Ireland and Spain have outstripped the rate of
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Figure 3 The trajectory of fuzzy Christianity: model and observations
Note: The observed values are those shown in Figure 2, where each country occupies a 60-year interval providing the best
overall fit with the model.
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change suggested here; others such as Austria and Italy
are following the projection more slowly.
In a few cases, the model does not fit particularly
well, even if one alters the time values on the
horizontal axis. In France, for example, the size of
the religious subpopulation has fallen relatively little in
recent decades, and secular growth has been at the
expense of fuzzy Christianity. In Denmark, the wholly
secular subpopulation is not as large as one might
expect, and fuzzy Christians are more prevalent than
elsewhere. Overall, though, Figure 3 provides a very
good representation of the full range of national
experiences of secularization found across the con-
tinent. The individual points marked on Figure 3 show
how well countries chosen to represent this range
(from Greece at one extreme to the Czech Republic at
the other) fit the model.
A number of scholars argue that the falls in
churchgoing and other expressions of institutional
Christianity are signs of religious change, not decline.
They see the large constituency of fuzzy Christians as
evidence that people continue, and will continue, to
value the services provided by the churches they no
longer attend. In their view, the relatively small size of
the overtly secular population suggests that most
people still want some kind of religious or spiritual
involvement. If they are right, then we would expect to
see continued growth, or at least stability at a high
level, in the neither-religious-nor-secular population.
The theoretical model offered here, in contrast,
predicts that not long after wholly secular people
outnumber the religious, the proportion of fuzzy
Christians will reach a plateau and then start to fall.
Ultimately they will be overtaken by the completely
secular subpopulation, which will continue to grow
steadily.
This pattern is in fact the one we observe in the
countries that have travelled furthest along a seculariz-
ing trajectory: France, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. Others—including the United
Kingdom—will soon reach the point of fuzzy Christian
decline unless there is a sudden change in the direction
of secular and religious trends. Fuzzy fidelity is not a
new kind of religion, or a proxy for as yet unfocused
spiritual seeking; it is a staging post on the road from
religious to secular hegemony.
Concluding Comments
While there are indeed many interesting variations in
European religion—countries may be high or low in
affiliation, attendance, and belief—there is also a
single, inescapable theme. Religion is in decline. Each
generation in every country surveyed is less religious
than the last, measured by the best available index of
religiosity. Although there are some minor differences
in the speed of the decline (the most religious
countries are changing more quickly than the least
religious), the magnitude of the fall in religiosity from
the early to the late 20th century has been remarkably
constant across the continent.
There is a tension between the search for common
patterns and describing the complexity of a situation.
Despite the undoubted diversity that exists in Europe it
is possible to identify common themes, with the rise
and fall of fuzzy fidelity being one of the most
important. The starting points are different across
the continent, but the forces at work may be much
the same. The consequences include the spread of
indifference, which is ultimately as damaging for
religion as scepticism.
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